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Abstract  
Background: Clinical decision support systems (CDSS) are a category of health 
information technologies that can assist clinicians to choose optimal treatments. 
These support systems are based on clinical trials and expert knowledge; however, 
the amount of data available to these systems is limited. For this reason, CDSSs 
could be significantly improved by using the knowledge obtained by treating 
patients. This knowledge is mainly contained in patient records, whose usage is 
restricted due to privacy and confidentiality constraints. 
Methods: A treatment effectiveness measure, containing valuable information for 
treatment prescription, was defined and a method to extract this measure from 
patient records was developed. This method uses an advanced cryptographic 
technology, known as secure Multiparty Computation (henceforth referred to as 
MPC), to preserve the privacy of the patient records and the confidentiality of the 
clinicians’ decisions.  
Results: Our solution enables to compute the effectiveness measure of a treatment 
based on patient records, while preserving privacy. Moreover, clinicians are not 
burdened with the computational and communication costs introduced by the 
privacy-preserving techniques that are used. Our system is able to compute the 
effectiveness of 100 treatments for a specific patient in less than 24 minutes, querying 
a database containing 20,000 patient records.  
Conclusion: This paper presents a novel and efficient clinical decision support 
system, that harnesses the potential and insights acquired from treatment data, 
while preserving the privacy of patient records and the confidentiality of clinician 
decisions. 
Keywords: clinical decision support systems, anti-HIV agents, secure 
multiparty computation, privacy, confidentiality 
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1 Background and significance 
The constantly rising cost of national healthcare [1] associated to an aging population 
has highlighted the need for a revolution in traditional healthcare [2,3]. Most 
stakeholders (clinicians, healthcare providers, policy makers and patients) agree that 
the solution lies in new approaches in which technology and health information 
technology (HIT) play a critical role [4, 5]. HIT services aim to automate and 
optimize healthcare processes with the overall goal of providing a more effective 
treatment process for patients. One of the main hurdles of HIT is the need to 
preserve the privacy of the patients’ data while using it to improve the quality of 
the tools that could be used by clinicians to provide better treatments. Legislation 
on the privacy of sensitive data, such as Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) and General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 
2016/679 (GDPR), is becoming more and more stringent, affecting all parties who 
handle sensitive data. In order to accommodate the demands of the legislators 
without compromising the opportunities for healthcare offered by IT services, new 
solutions are needed to ensure patients’ data is effectively processed while preserving 
their privacy. In this paper we focus on one specific category of HIT systems: Clinical 
decision support systems (CDSSs). 
A CDSS is a system that provides clinicians, patients, and other individuals with 
intelligently processed disease-specific and patient-specific data. Several different 
categories of CDSSs can be found in literature, e.g. diagnostic tools, expert systems, 
workflow support, medication dosing support, order or billing facilitators, point-of-
care alerts. The patient-specific data are presented in an appropriate form at 
appropriate times, in order to facilitate and improve treatment selection and quality 
of healthcare [6]. A CDSS is not meant to replace the clinician or make decisions in 
her or his place, but rather to help clinicians to determine the optimal treatment for 
each specific patient. Systematic reviews [7,8] reported that CDSSs significantly 
improved clinical practice. A review [7] on one hundred studies reported 
improvements for more than 62% of the trials on practitioner performance, reminder 
systems, drug-dosing systems and disease management systems. A review on seventy 
studies [8] reported a significant improvement of clinical practice in 68% of trials. 
Although general observations on the beneficial effects of CDSSs are limited by the 
heterogeneity of the studies, recent systematic reviews [9,10] report an improvement 
in health care processes in 148 randomized, controlled trials and in 85% of twenty-
two studies respectively. 
As a use-case to present our proposed solution to the problem of preserving the 
privacy of patients’ data, we focus on an expert system for HIV treatment. The 
extreme variability in viral genotypes and the spreading of strains resistant to 
antiretroviral drugs make the prescription of optimal HIV-1 treatments a complex 
task; CDSSs are used in order to minimize or, ideally, prevent the prescription of 
suboptimal treatments. Some examples of relevant CDSSs range from simple quality 
improvement consultation programs like HIVQUAL-US [11] that monitors clinical 
performance, to more sophisticated data-driven systems like Euresist [12] and 
knowledge-based systems like the HIVdb Program [13]. In this paper we show the 
application of secure Multi Party Computation (MPC) to the “comparative Drug 
Ranking System” (cDRS). cDRS is a CDSS that helps to minimize the choice of sub-
optimal HIV treatments by performing a meta-ranking analysis of three expert 
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systems for HIV-1 genotypic drug resistance interpretation (ANRS, HIVdb, Rega) to 
resolve possible discordances between them [14-17]. The discordances in drug resistance 
between the three expert systems are not negligible [18,19], and are the result of different 
methodologies used by the systems to assess which set of mutations and mutational 
patterns lead to which level of drug resistance (susceptible, low-level resistance, 
intermediate resistance, high resistance) and of the limited amount of clinical data 
available for each specific set of mutations. A CDSS able to help clinicians in resolving 
such discordances is essential to avoid the administration of sub-optimal HIV treatments. 
Research on the spread of the HIV epidemics has led to the development of tools 
(e.g., phylogenetic trees) able to correlate specific viral sequences in different patients 
and reconstruct with good accuracy the network of infections within a community [20]. 
In addition, transmission events between patients can be identified by analysing the viral 
genotypes, given the uniqueness of specific sets of mutations [21,22]. Hence, it is no 
wonder that strict privacy regulations prevent the sharing of patient data (e.g., viral 
genotype, treatments and their outcomes) that feed and improve these clinical decision 
support systems. Moreover, clinicians might not be able, or willing, to openly share their 
treatment decisions and their outcomes, even though such information might be 
beneficial for the decision-making process of their colleagues. In conclusion, there is a 
tremendous amount of valuable information that is unavailable to clinicians because of 
privacy and confidentiality constraints.  
An ideal system should allow clinicians to compare their chosen treatment against 
the outcome of the treatments chosen by other clinicians for similar genotypes. Such a 
system should enable them to obtain actionable information that currently is not 
accessible at the scale and level of detail needed to maximize its usefulness. Such a system 
should also solve the issue of utilizing patient and clinicians’ data in a secure way without 
leaking sensitive information.  
The need for techniques to tackle this type of challenge is being addressed by public 
authorities as well: an important example in this sense is iDASH [23] (integrating data 
for analysis, anonymization, and sharing), a national center for biomedical computing 
established by the U.S. National Institutes of Health with the aim of developing 
algorithms and tools for the study of medical data in a privacy-preserving manner. 
In this paper we present a solution that uses cryptographic techniques, namely a so-
called secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) protocol, to achieve the desired 
functionality without violating any of the privacy constraints. Given 𝑛 mutually 
distrusting parties 𝑃1, … , 𝑃𝑛, each holding private inputs 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛, the goal of MPC is to 
allow the parties to compute the value 𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) of a function f on their inputs, without 
revealing any other information than 𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛), and without resorting to an external 
trusted party. Notice that these goals and requirements closely match the dilemma 
described above, as computing on medical data can provide very useful information, but 
privacy constraints forbid to freely exchange this data.  
Early research in the 1980s [24-27] established the theoretical feasibility bounds for 
MPC; informally stated, this line of research proved that any function f with finite 
domain and finite image can be evaluated securely in an MPC fashion. The precise 
security properties that can be achieved depend on the behavior of players and on the 
underlying communication model. 
In the last one or two decades, research has shifted its focus to the efficiency and 
implementation of MPC. Since the first market-ready deployment of MPC in 2008 [28], 
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MPC solutions have been used in various practical contexts, e.g., stock market order 
matching [29], job market inquiries [30], and frequency bands auctions [31]. 
Application of MPC and other related cryptographic techniques in the medical 
domain has also been investigated in recent times, first in the study of general 
methods such as privacy-preserving data mining for joint data analysis between 
hospitals [32] and branching programs for privacy-preserving classification of medical 
ElectroCardioGram signals [33], then also in the presentation of specific use-case 
scenarios such as secure disclosure of patient data for disease surveillance [34], R-
based healthcare statistics [35] and privacy-preserving genome-wide association 
study [36], privacy-preserving genome analysis [37] and search of similar patients in 
genomic data [38].  Moreover, various software suites and implementation 
frameworks for MPC have been made available [39-42]. 
Our MPC-based solution leverages private patient data and confidential 
clinicians’ decisions, distributed amongst various hospitals and institutions, to 
provide additional information on the optimality of treatments. In particular, our 
solution allows clinicians to compare past treatments of ‘similar’ patients to find the 
optimal treatment for new patients preventing any unauthorized party, including 
the ones performing the computations, to access the input data.  
2 M aterials and M ethods  
2.1 M easuring treatment effectiveness from patient records 
The viral genotype of a patient refers to the genetic sequence(s) of the HIV-1 
virus strain that is most prevalent at the time of the blood test. The HIV-1 virus 
RNA genome contains 3 key regions that encode for enzymes critical to the life cycle 
of the virus: protease (P), integrase (I) and reverse transcriptase (RT). Each region 
encodes for enzymes with 99, 288 and 560 amino-acids, respectively, all of which 
could in principle mutate. These mutations play an important role in the drug 
resistance of the virus strains.  
Given an HIV-1 patient, the desired functionality will enable us to obtain 
treatment results of ‘similar’ patients, and therefore we need to define what it means 
for two patients, or two viral genotypes, to be similar, by defining a metric or 
distance function that quantifies this similarity. Since all expert systems indicate 
resistance to drugs on the basis of substitutions in the amino acid sequence of the 
wild type HIV-1, we need a way to compute the distance in the amino acid sequences 
of the viral proteins targeted by antiretroviral drugs: protease, reverse transcriptase 
and integrase. Metrics of distances between amino acid sequences are fairly complex 
and often assessed via neural networks [43]. The assignment of a suitable similarity 
metric is outside the scope of this paper and, for this reason, we have chosen to use 
a simplified viral genotype representation with a generic metric as a proof of concept. 
However, our solution is flexible, because it accommodates other representations and 
metrics. The main goal of this work is to demonstrate the applicability of MPC for 
HIV-1 CDSSs and open the door to many other applications that have been deemed 
impossible because of privacy and confidentiality restrictions.  
From now on we shall represent viral genotypes 𝑣 as bit strings of a fixed length 
𝑁, i.e., 𝑣 ∈ {0,1}𝑁. We can think of each bit in this bit-string as an indicator for the 
presence or the absence of a specific mutation at a specific position. 
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Since there are only 97 relevant positions with commonly 1 or 2 resistance-associated 
substitutions [44] we can expect 𝑁 to be somewhere between 100 and 200. The distance 
between two viral genotypes 𝑣1 and 𝑣2 is defined by the Hamming distance between the 
bit strings, 
𝐻(𝑣1, 𝑣2) = |{𝑖 ∶  𝑣1(𝑖) ≠ 𝑣2(𝑖)}|, 
which equals the number of positions at which the bits strings are different. Given 
this metric we can define two viral genotypes 𝑣1 and 𝑣2 to be similar if their Hamming 
distance is smaller than a certain threshold 𝐵, i.e., 𝐻(𝑣1, 𝑣2) < 𝐵. Even though this metric 
is a simplification of the metrics used in practice, it is quite similar to the rule-based 
metrics used in the CDSSs of [14-17]. These CDSSs match viral genotypes based on the 
presence of resistance-associated substitutions in amino acid positions, which can be seen 
as a Boolean expression.  
Suboptimal treatments of HIV-1 patients result in faster emergence of resistant 
strains and this emergence renders the treatment ineffective. Hence, a way to measure 
the effectiveness of a treatment 𝑡𝑟 is by indicating the time-to-treatment-failure (𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑡𝑟). 
The 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑡𝑟 is defined as the time (in days) between the start of a therapy and either a 
therapy switch, a discontinuation of therapy or death [45,46]. Hence, given an HIV-1 
patient with genotype 𝑣 we would, for example, like to compute the average 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑡𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑣) 
over all patients with similar genotype 𝑣𝑖, as an indication for the unknown true 
effectiveness measure 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑡𝑟(𝑣):  
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑡𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑣) =  
1
|{𝑖 ∶  𝐻(𝑣, 𝑣𝑖) < 𝐵}|
∑ 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑡𝑟(𝑣𝑖)
𝑖∶ 𝐻(𝑣,𝑣𝑖)<𝐵
 . 
Note that 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑡𝑟(𝑣) can only be computed for patients that have received a treatment 
𝑡𝑟 that has become ineffective and that the average 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑡𝑟(𝑣)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  can only be computed 
when the set {𝑖 ∶  𝐻(𝑣, 𝑣𝑖) < 𝐵} is nonempty.  
The described functionality could be realized by constructing a single database, 
containing a record for all completed treatments. Each record should contain the viral 
genotype, the administered treatment 𝑡𝑟 and 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑡𝑟 — see Figure 1. From this database 
clinicians, should be able to query the average 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑡𝑟 for similar patients obtaining an 
indication for the effectiveness of that specific treatment 𝑡𝑟.  
However, these database records contain private information. The uniqueness of HIV 
virus mutations causes patients to be (almost) identifiable by only their viral genotype 
[21,22]. Moreover, patients with almost identical viral genotypes have most likely infected 
each other. Combined with other, possibly public sources of information, this data reveals 
a great deal of personal information. MPC offers a cryptographic solution to achieve the 
desired functionality without violating any of the privacy constraints.  
 
Figure 1: Database containing sensitive information. 
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2.2 Secure M ultiparty Computation 
Several considerations have to be made when applying MPC to a given problem. 
For instance, one may assume that parties 𝑃1, … , 𝑃𝑛 will behave semi-honestly 
(meaning that they may try to learn information on the other parties’ inputs, but 
do follow the protocol), or that it is instead necessary to provide security against 
fully malicious players that deviate from the protocol instructions; one may focus on 
a two-party setting, or instead work with protocols that can support any number of 
parties. Another important parameter that varies among protocols is the number 𝑡 
of corrupted parties that can be tolerated out of the total number 𝑛 of parties, with 
typical ranges being 𝑡 < 𝑛/3, 𝑡 < 𝑛/2 (honest majority), and 𝑡 < 𝑛 (‘unbounded’ 
number of corrupted parties). 
These are just some examples of the different considerations to be made. A 
remark of notable importance is that many desirable properties of MPC may 
negatively impact performance, or even be mutually exclusive, which means that the 
choice of an MPC protocol may be subject to important trade-offs. The reader can 
refer to [47] for a comprehensive discussion of MPC. 
2.3 The M PC framework of our choice: SPDZ  
We base our MPC solution on the SPDZ protocol [48,49]. The protocol is 
distinguished for its fast performance, and is implemented in a freely-accessible 
software suite [40,42] for UNIX-based systems1. 
SPDZ follows the so-called share-compute-reveal paradigm: each input 𝑥𝑖 of the 
function 𝑓 to be computed is ‘dispersed’ (or, formally speaking, secret-shared2) into 
𝑛 pieces of data, called shares, each of which is assigned to a party; this process has 
the property that no information on 𝑥𝑖 can be extracted at all from a set of shares, 
unless such a set contains all shares (in which case 𝑥𝑖 can be completely recovered). 
Subsequently, parties execute a ‘computation’ protocol; as a result of this step, each 
party will have a share of the output 𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) of the function. Once all shares 
have been gathered, the output can then be reconstructed.  
Other cryptographic techniques such as homomorphic encryption [50, 51] could 
potentially be of relevance for private data analysis, but we ruled out these 
alternatives, because of they would induce a huge computational overhead in our 
setting. 
The share-compute-reveal approach is particularly well-suited for the client-
server model we are interested in. Indeed, we do not wish to burden the input holders 
(i.e., the clinicians) with heavy computation, and would rather outsource this 
computation to external entities with a solid IT infrastructure. This can be readily 
achieved within the share-compute-reveal paradigm: the ‘input’ parties (clients) 
simply need to supply their secret-shared inputs to two or more ‘computing’ parties 
(servers), who will execute the computation protocol on these inputs, and then 
                                                          
1 Notice that support for the SPDZ-2 software suite (implementing the eponymous MPC protocol) is 
being discontinued. Development moved to SCALE-MAMBA, another implementation of the SPDZ 
protocol. 
2 It is important to notice that ‘sharing’, here, is by no means a synonym of ‘revealing’; on the 
contrary, it can be seen as a strong form of encryption. 
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communicate the shares of the output to the input parties, which can thus reconstruct 
the output.  
It is important to remark that the SPDZ protocol does not, per se, distinguish 
between input and computing parties. A framework for MPC in a client-server model 
was presented in [52]; moreover, in [53] the SPDZ protocol was adjusted to the client-
server setting. 
The SPDZ protocol is divided into an ‘offline’ phase and an ‘online’ phase. The 
offline phase can be executed before the function inputs 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛 are known, and its 
goal is to produce some secret-shared auxiliary data that will be used in the 
evaluation of 𝑓; producing this data can be a computationally-intensive process, but the 
since secret inputs are not required, this step can be executed during idle time and well 
before the actual secure computation will take place. Once the auxiliary data has been 
produced, the evaluation of 𝑓 can be performed very efficiently: this is of particular 
relevance for our use-case, where input parties (clinicians) need to obtain the output of 
the function 𝑓 within a matter of minutes, while preprocessing material can be produced 
in the background by the computing parties, so that the input parties are not burdened 
by this computational task.  
3 Results 
The functionality we have achieved utilizes HIV patient records to gain new insights 
in the effectiveness of HIV treatments. The MPC protocol ensures privacy of the patients 
and the confidentiality of the clinicians’ treatment decisions.  
The proposed solution distinguishes between ‘input’ parties, the clinicians supplying 
the database records, and ‘computing’ parties running the SPDZ protocol. The input 
parties additively secret-share their data records and distribute the shares amongst the 
computing parties (see Figure 2). As discussed in the previous section, this secret-sharing 
process has the property that private information can only be retrieved from the full set 
of shares; hence, if at least one of the 𝑛 computing parties does not collude with others, 
privacy is protected. We have chosen 𝑛 to be equal to 2, but for stronger privacy 
requirements we could choose to increase it. 
 
Figure 2: Secret sharing database records. 
As a result, the two computing parties each hold a share of all the database records. 
SPDZ allows the evaluation of queries to this secret-shared database in such a way that 
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only the output of the query (the average time-to-treatment-failure ( 𝑇𝑇𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) per 
treatment) is revealed to the clinician, and no additional information is leaked to either 
the querying clinician, or the computing parties. In order to protect the private 
information in the query (the viral genotype), we secret-share the query amongst the 
computing parties in a similar manner. The computing parties thus take as private 
inputs their shares of the database records and their share of the query. They do not 
reconstruct the result of the computation (the average 𝑇𝑇𝐹) themselves; instead, 
each of them sends their share of the result to the querying clinician who, in turn, 
recombines the shares to reconstruct the output. This way the result is only revealed 
to the clinician, and not to the computing parties (cf. Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Query architecture of the privacy-preserving CDSS. 
Our solution allows clinicians to compare their treatment of choice against the 
outcome of treatments previously chosen by other clinicians for patients with similar 
genotype, without revealing any private information to either the clinicians or the 
computing parties. In fact, the computing parties only learn the size and format of 
the database and the number of queries to the database. This system is secure as 
long as the two computing parties do not collude. We have implemented the online 
phase of the protocol by using the SPDZ software suite [40].  
3.1 Performance – online phase 
In comparison to implementing the functionality without privacy protection, 
using MPC introduces computational and communication overhead. The main 
reason for this unavoidable overhead is that, in an MPC protocol, the computation 
path should be oblivious, i.e. independent, of the input values, since it would 
otherwise leak information. Therefore conditional expressions such as if- and while-
statements cannot be directly implemented: other (more expensive) techniques to 
obtain the same output in an oblivious way are required. Similarly, it might not be 
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possible to implement efficient database searches that require ordering or re-structuring 
the database in a non-oblivious way. 
We have evaluated the performance of the online phase of our protocol by deploying 
the computing parties on two different machines, each using one core of a i7-7567U CPU 
running at 3.50GHz and 32 GB of RAM, in a local network with 1 Gbit/s throughput. 
Moreover, we have instantiated the SPDZ protocol with 40-bit statistical security, 128-
bit computational security and a 128-bit prime field.  
The results in Figure 4 show the computation times that are needed for answering 
one query, for artificially-generated databases with sizes ranging from 100 to 20,000 
records. The maximum 20,000 approximates the number of HIV-positive registered 
individuals in the Netherlands [54]; thus even though a single patient may give rise to 
more than one entry, we consider 20,000 to be an appropriate size to simulate a nation-
wide database. The experiment is repeated multiple times, resulting in several data 
points per database size. Recall that per query we compute the average 𝑇𝑇𝐹 conditioned 
on ‘similar’ patients for 100 different treatments. Our current implementation can 
answer one query in less than 24 minutes if the database contains 20,000 patient records. 
The computational complexity scales linearly in the number of database records.  
 
Figure 4: CDSS computation time. 
3.2 Performance – offline phase  
In the SPDZ protocol certain computational tasks are executed in the offline phase, 
that is independent of the MPC use-case and that can be implemented with existing 
protocols. For this reason, we have merely estimated the computational costs of it. The 
offline phase can be run at any time to generate a large database of preprocessed data 
which, in turn, is consumed during the online phase.  
The performance of the offline phase can be quantified in the number of the so-called 
multiplication triples that are generated per second. In [55] various approaches for 
generating multiplication triples on i7-4790 and i7-3770S CPUs with 16 to 32 GB of 
RAM in a setting similar to ours (1 Gbit/s throughput) were evaluated. With two 
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parties, 64-bit statistical security, 128-bit computational security and a 128-bit prime 
field, they generate 30,000 triples/s. To evaluate a single query on a database with 20,000 
records approximately 40 million multiplication triples are required. In this setting 
these triples can thus be generated in approximately 22 minutes. 
4 Discussion and Conclusions 
We presented a novel approach for clinical decision support systems, making use 
of advanced cryptographic techniques to process private information without 
revealing it. Our solution allows clinicians to obtain valuable information on the 
several different HIV treatments that could be effective for a given patient, enabling 
them to query the success rates of treatments chosen by other clinicians for similar 
viral genotypes. By making use of MPC, we ensure both the privacy of the clinicians’ 
treatment choices, thus releasing clinicians from liability concerns, and the privacy 
of patients, arguably making our solution in line with regulations on the use of 
medical information. Our solution can thus make valuable information finally 
available to clinicians, potentially improving HIV treatment and research on HIV 
drug effectiveness. 
Towards a fully operational deployment, however, some points are yet to be 
addressed. Notably, the SPDZ software framework is designed for research purposes 
only, which means that our implementation should be audited and checked for 
vulnerabilities. For what concerns efficiency and scalability, we stress the fact that 
any CDSS for HIV treatment should produce a suggestion within minutes, since 
practitioners would typically query the system right after visiting a patient, and 
would expect an answer before the patient leaves their office. As shown in Figure 4, 
our solution answers a query within 24 minutes, for a database size roughly matching 
the number of HIV-positive registered individuals in the Netherlands [54]; while we 
consider this result to be sufficient for the proof-of-concept presented in this paper, 
some further work would be needed for a full-scale deployment. Notice that the 
running time of the implementation could be improved by several means, e.g. by 
using a low-level but very fast programming language such as C to encode the 
protocol, by further parallelizing the computation, or by making use of high-
performance computing machines instead of consumer-level hardware. Another 
interesting point to be investigated is given by countermeasures against possible 
misuses of our solution, such as a malicious user that poses a high amount of queries 
in order to extract sensitive information from the received output. 
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